Claudio Guler

Although the rest of the Middle East is now rightly in the spotlight, Iran, with a simmering opposition movement and a highly controversial nuclear program (the focal point in regional diplomacy prior to the ‘Jasmine revolutions’) will no doubt return to the forefront of regional affairs very soon. However, the diplomatic equation in the conflict between Iran and the West may be changing, and contrary to the sometimes hysterical warnings of some commentators in the West and the bellicose rhetoric of Iran’s president, Tehran is in a corner. Below some points to keep in mind when analyzing the situation:

- What country, more precisely what regime, currently faces an existential threat and finds itself surrounded by the world’s most powerful fighting force on three of four borders (principally Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, but also Iraq): nuclear-armed Israel or Iran?

- How much of this all is a securitization game? Prime Minister Netanyahu and especially Israel’s political right keep the focus on the country’s purported ‘insecurity’ and off the West Bank; President Ahmadinejad, in turn, exploits the external threat to consolidate support back home and divert attention from his lousy track record in actually governing Iran.

- If Iran decides to weaponize, will it not first withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)? The 1980 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the NPT, which the US and Iran have both signed and ratified, respectively, demand it. Although this instance could very well prove the exception to the rule, Iran is not North Korea. Iran maintains relations and accords with many other states in the international system, all of which count on it to uphold some modicum of predictability. It is likely to do so despite its belligerent rhetoric.

- Even if Iran obtains a bomb does that suddenly mean that it cannot be deterred? Is it genuinely plausible that policymakers in Tehran will commit to a suicide pact? It takes more than one person to deploy a nuclear weapon. President Ahmadinejad, incidentally, is far from top dog in all things military in Iran.

- The West’s present negotiating strategy vis-à-vis Iran – suspend uranium enrichment and comply with all International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards or incur sanctions, other unpleasantries (read covert war) and possible military strikes – reveals just how asymmetric the strategic environment actually is. The West, led by the US, rather than mollify Iran’s legitimate security concerns, can bomb the country into serially delaying or discontinuing its nuclear weapons program, likely without causing intolerable harm to Western interests elsewhere throughout the region. Some salient omissions from the West’s negotiating platform include: public security guarantees and a public retraction of all threats of regime change and obliteration; a truly handsome cash and investment offer to induce Tehran to stop enriching uranium; a willingness to countenance ‘grand bargains’ that fully restore US-Iranian relations and would include Iran yielding to international concerns regarding its nuclear ambitions; Israeli nuclear disarmament.

On 3 February, the authoritative International Institute for Strategic Studies headquartered in London released a comprehensive assessment of Iran’s WMD capabilities. The report concludes that Iran can most likely not break-out using its monitored stock of enriched uranium without tipping off IAEA inspectors and inviting an immediate strike against its nuclear facilities, and possibly other targets. More alarmingly – notwithstanding that only circumstantial evidence in support of this scenario has to date surfaced in the public domain – Iran could be running a parallel enrichment program with the aim of clandestinely achieving a break-out or surge capacity and eventually a full-scale nuclear deterrent capability.

The game is certainly coming to a head. Prevailing intelligence estimates – admittedly imperfect and often conspicuously pliable – put crunch time in the 2012-2016 range, with apprehensions mounting significantly after 2012. Indeed there is little doubt that Tehran will be returning to center stage of regional diplomacy as soon as these momentous events in the rest of the region wind down.

Make sure to check out The Leveretts’ The Race for Iran.

Original Print: http://isnblog.ethz.ch/security/iran-little-room-for-maneuver#more-13434

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For almost two decades now, US policymakers, foreign policy pundits and nonproliferation experts, among others, have fretted that Iran’s efforts to master the nuclear fuel cycle are primarily aimed at developing an atomic bomb. Tehran has done little to allay their concerns.

Although a nuclear weapon may be the ultimate goal – primarily to guarantee the country’s historically precarious territorial integrity and national autonomy, but also to affect the regional nuclear balance – Iran could just as well decide to stop short of the nuclear breakout point, securing for itself a so-called surge capacity.

A surge capacity, which Japan for example enjoys, involves having all the components needed to assemble and deploy a nuclear weapon within a reasonable time frame on hand – near weapons-grade uranium or plutonium, a delivery system, trained personnel and nuclear know-how – but intentionally leaving them all apart. Such an arrangement would likely allow Iran to nominally maintain its status as a non-nuclear weapons state and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory, and to simultaneously enjoy the added diplomatic leverage afforded by its latent capability.

Moreover, by not going nuclear, the strategy could help mitigate the impetus for a much-feared regional nuclear arms race involving Saudi Arabia, Egypt and maybe Syria.

The reason this approach is of interest is because during the Shah’s rule in the 1960s and 1970s, Iran pursued exactly that, a surge capacity. Are today’s efforts the Shah’s policies redux or are they instead aimed at acquiring a full nuclear capability? The West does not and probably cannot know, but negotiators on all sides are unlikely to be discounting the possibility of the former and its potential for compromise.

Original Print: http://www.examiner.com/x-44036-Foreign-Policy-Examiner~y2010m4d8-Iran-the-Bomb-and-a-Surge-Capacity

Aside from that fact that the US NMD doesn’t work, it antagonizes Russia and works against crucial arms agreements, but the damage done is not irreversible, Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch, 26 Sep 2008

US National Missile Defense (NMD) is misleading. It unnecessarily antagonizes Russia, optimizes US imperialism, strains the US government’s budget – and doesn’t work.

It is high time for the US to consider putting to use the pledge of dismantling its NMD system to reorient the US-Russia arms control agenda. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty stands at the center of this debate.

National Missile Defense employs complex technologies to intercept incoming ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads. A powerful radar system that detects incoming missiles and a battery of countervailing missiles used to eliminate the threat comprise it – in theory, quite intriguing.

The idea of the NMD, first embodied by the Nike-Zeus program, has been floating around Washington since the late 1950s. However, until President Ronald Reagan’s term, it received little priority. That changed on 23 March 1983 when Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative for the NMD. The media quickly dubbed the concept “Star Wars.”

Reagan’s policy initiative survives to this day. Its offspring is the NMD system President George W Bush built in Alaska/California and Poland/Czech Republic, and its deployment is inimical.

Arms control is the centerpiece of US-Russia relations. The two states stockpile over 9,000 active nuclear warheads that amount to roughly 90 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal.

In 1972, the US and the USSR negotiated the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) to limit the incidence of expensive and menacing arms races, the logic behind it being the following: If side A can block side B’s missiles, then side B would have to build more missiles to overcome side A’s NMD system. The inverse is also true. To mitigate potentially boundless spending and militarization, the ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of NMD systems for either side’s entire territory, and limits the testing of NMD systems in “ABM Mode” – the latter stipulation leaving room for interpretation.

The ABM Treaty plays a prominent role in the US-Russia arms control regime, which also includes the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the 1992 Treaty on Armed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and several Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (STARTs), among others.

President Bill Clinton roughly adhered to the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Albeit permitting research on NMD systems and advocating modification of the ABM Treaty itself, he maintained that the deployment of an NMD system was inopportune.

Clinton’s heedful tone, however, briskly changed with the 2000 election of George W Bush. The Bush administration’s negotiation agenda in July 2001 was radical and obdurate.

His administration argued that in order to be able to protect US citizens from “rogue” state threats like Iran and North Korea, the NMD was necessary. Any ABM Treaty renegotiations that limited NMD deployment would be rejected.

Five months later, Bush acted by removing the legal impediments to NMD. On 13 December 2001, he announced the US’ unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, effective six months later.

Putin did not respond warmly to Bush’s decision. Russia declined to cooperate with START II treaty requirements following the US’ unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The START III treaty failed to gain any traction at all.

Upon concluding that the US NMD installations planned for construction in Poland and the Czech Republic were in fact going to be installed, Putin additionally declared on 14 July 2007 Russia’s intentions to suspend its cooperation with the CFE Treaty. He also threatened to withdraw from the INF Treaty. In other words, following the US’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the US-Russia arms control regime began to fray.

For all of the trouble Bush’s withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty and deployment of a NMD system created, did any benefits ensue? Not really.

Russia has yet to buy the US argument for protection from “rogue” state threats like Iran and North Korea.

Also, the NMD simply does not work. Tests have yet to demonstrate the US NMD system’s ability to ward off a nuclear strike. A small number of decoys, housed inside a ballistic missile carrying a nuclear warhead could easily overwhelm the system. The latest test conducted by the US military installed a guidance chip in the target missile to direct the destroying missile. This, at the very least, stretches the definition of “success.”

So what is the point behind US NMD? Bertel Heurlin argues that the US NMD is a flagrant example of US strategic expansionism. The long-term implications of this philosophy are what concerns Russia.

Besides the fact that the US NMD does not work and antagonizes Russia, it is expensive. The US spent an average of US$8.68 billion per year during 2006–2008 on the NMD, and it tops the list of US military expenditures for research programs.

Therefore, in a nutshell, the Bush administration spent tens-of-billions of dollars to deploy a system that doesn’t work, against a threat that has yet to materialize, and the consequences of which resulted in the dissolution of key treaties in one of the most sensitive areas of US foreign policy.

The damage done is not irreversible. A deployed NMD system supplies the US with leverage. Pledging to consider its deconstruction – which could save money – could be used to draw Russia back to the negotiating table to start rebuilding the US-Russia arms control architecture.

Options exist. START II would limit each side to 3,000 to 3,500 active nuclear warheads. START III could bring this number down even further to 2,000 or 2,500 nuclear warheads. Russia’s re-entry into the CFE Treaty and continued observance of the INF Treaty should also be addressed. The ABM Treaty requires recommitment.

Once Bush leaves office, changing course is a necessity. On 18 September 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev used a rather conciliatory tone toward the US at a ceremony for the new US ambassador to the Kremlin. His temperament stood in stark contrast to Russia’s affirmative demeanor immediately following the South Ossetia war in August.

Although today’s Russian leadership deserves little praise, nuclear arms control trumps these concerns.

The US NMD is not a good idea. Especially when it has still to prove its tactical utility.

Original Print: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=92031

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Rather than making a case for an Israeli strike against Iran the US could find a more amenable partner in Iran by toning down the virulent rhetoric, Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch, 15 Sep 2008

Your recent opinion article in the Wall Street Journal, Israel, Iran and the Bomb, makes the case for a preventive Israeli air strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. In the article, you state that doing so will buy the West some much needed time.

I agree with you that a nuclear Iran is a decidedly unpleasant subject and would constitute a direct violation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All the same, your approach is dangerously myopic. This response argues in favor of an alternative approach, one that more carefully considers Iran’s perspective.

I do believe the Islamic Republic aims to develop a nuclear weapon: Why otherwise the obstinacy surrounding IAEA inspection requests? Yet Iran’s grounds for desiring a nuclear weapon are not altogether irrational.

Iran has an extensive history of foreign interference. The Qajar dynasty (1781 – 1925); the Russians (1911); the British and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1925 – 1953); the 1953 CIA-led Operation Ajax, which ousted the democratically elected prime minister Mohammed Mosaddeq; and finally, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a figure widely regarded an agent of US interests (1953 – 1979). This legacy, vivid in many Iranians’ memories, serves as political ammunition for the theocracy in Tehran.

More immediately, however, Iran finds itself encircled by the US military in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, surrounded by the disproportionate might of the US.

The buyback contract Iran uses in its petroleum sector exemplifies this fear of foreign interference. The contract is a financing agreement that obliges any international oil company (IOC) to pay, upfront, the costs of exploring and drilling in Iran’s oil and natural gas fields. The National Iranian Oil Company then extracts the product and rewards the IOC a predetermined return on any profits realized. This arrangement prevents any IOC from establishing deep-seated influence in Tehran by way of foreign direct investment.

The plurality that exists within Iranian politics also requires mention, which you fail to appreciate. The best, and unfortunately squandered, example of this was the Iranian-led negotiation effort of 2003. At the time, reformist president Seyyed Mohammad Khatami made an overture to the US by way of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran.

Regrettably, the Bush administration offhandedly dismissed Khatami’s offer at a time when Iran’s leverage, with respect to today, was limited. It is curious to note that back then you were in the influential position of undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security.

In 2005, the radical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president and Iran’s foreign policy became increasingly antagonistic. Hawkish ideologues seem to compliment one another.

Throughout your piece, you emphasize the immediacy of the Iranian nuclear threat. Here again, your analysis overlooks a critical factor. Israel, the purported target of an Iranian bomb, has its own nuclear deterrent.

You also openly call for regime change in Iran. The US tried this in 1953 and it backfired 26 years later, giving rise to the theocracy now ruling Iran. (Saddam’s 1980 invasion, admittedly, solidified the regime’s power.) With the US military standing at Iran’s doorstep, it is no wonder Tehran is hesitant to compromise on its nuclear program. No rational actor, under such hostile conditions would sacrifice its prime source of leverage.

Finally, you touch on the EU-3′s efforts. They have been ineffective. However, it is again hard to see how they could be effective if the US position is so openly hostile. By spearheading the dispute, Washington’s word is decisive. Why cut a deal with Brussels if Washington is going to dupe you anyway?

A preventive strike by Israel would gravely damage US-Iranian relations. Forget any plans for Iranian assistance in Iraq. Expect, rather, a deteriorating Iraqi security situation.

Sino-US relations would also suffer. China imports billions of dollars worth of oil from Iran every year and has other multi-billion dollar contracts with the National Iranian Oil Company. The largest, which materialized in 2004, is worth US$75-$100 billion and has a shelf life of 25 years. A strike would likely cause international oil prices to skyrocket and China would be exceedingly displeased. Additionally, the US economy could hardly cope. This unfortunately seems not to concern you: “We will be blamed for the strike anyway, and certainly feel whatever negative consequences result, so there is compelling logic to make it as successful as possible.”

To curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, direct US-Iranian dialogue is necessary. The nuclear question must be on the table and confidence-building steps, endorsed multilaterally, should be taken early on. For example, the US could pledge to refrain from using force until a renewed diplomatic effort is exhausted.

Ultimately, however, the US must be willing to compromise. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, other US restrictions against Iranian banks, the US’ list of state sponsors of terrorism as well as assistance with Iran’s civil nuclear program, as already offered by the EU-3, are all options. Brazenly advocating for regime change is not a sound negotiating platform.

The Israeli limited-strike option is viable even after a new US president takes office on 20 January 2009. By toning down the virulent rhetoric, the US may find in Iran a more amenable partner than it expects.

Original Print: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=91417