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The Climate Refugee Challenge

Published August 11, 2009 Climate Change Leave a Comment

Climate change must be considered from a security perspective as it portends to generate millions of climate refugees, rendering the issue of ‘environmentally induced migrants’ a leading 21st-century global security challenge, Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch, 14 Apr 2009

The chief obstacle in marshalling resources to curb climate change lies in clarifying the abstract nature and inconsistent onset of the issue. When and where will climate change occur? How long does the world have to react? Will climate change necessarily be bad for everyone?

Obscurity fuels skepticism, which in turn delays action. Considering climate change from a security perspective allays this quandary. Climate change portends to generate millions of climate refugees, imperil human security and threaten regional and international stability.

Rising sea levels, coastal erosion, the increased incidence of severe weather events, encroaching desertification and water shortages, all pose a threat to livelihoods. The ramifications of climate change are manifold; they incorporate, nevertheless, an unmistakable north-south component. Those least equipped to cope will likely be those most affected.

Numbers expected to ‘double’

In 2007, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reckoned it served some 31.7 million persons of concern under its mandate. This figure included 11.4 million political refugees, but did not take into account persons displaced by environmental change.

Projections on climate refugees vary widely. According to an UNHCR estimate, climate or environmental refugees totaled roughly 25 million in 1995. Professor Norman Myers of Green College, Oxford University, has put forth other often-cited estimates. By 2010, Professor Myers forecasts the 25 million figure to double to 50 million. He counsels, nevertheless, that “the 1995 estimate of 25 million environmental refugees is cautious and conservative.”

By 2050, most observers project climate refugees to swell into the range of 150 to 200 million. If accurate, these figures readily surpass those of conventional political refugees.

Not-so-trite semantics

Albeit popular in the press, the term “climate refugee” enjoys no legal authority. The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is the core treaty of international refugee law. Article 1 defines a refugee as any person who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.” The definition does not afford binding legal protection to environmentally displaced persons, and focuses instead on political refugees and refugees of violent conflict.

A 1967 Protocol later amended the 1951 Convention and removed geographic and time constraints, rendering the convention a more universal document. Climate refugees, however, remained outside the legal framework. The UN world recognizes this dissimilarity and employs a verbose working definition instead – “environmentally induced migrant.”

The result puts humanitarians and environmentalists compassionately at odds. Humanitarians argue their limited resources are already overstretched. Environmentalists note that climate change and consequently environmental displacement are byproducts of human-led industrialization. Sheltering those victimized by climate change is a moral and security imperative.

Governments, academics and NGOs are exploring measures to close this loophole, particularly in the run-up to the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen from 7-18 December. The near-term prospects, however, remain unpropitious.

An adaptation fund focusing on least developed countries (LDC) and other developing states is to go on line soon. It was established under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). All the same, Dr Koko Warner of the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS) told ISN Security Watch: “[It is not] clear whether issues such as resettlement or migration will actually be eligible for adaptation funding. Right now, the conversation is a little too early.”

Professor Frank Biermann of the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam explained to ISN Security Watch that “politically speaking, we are now in the process of agenda setting…an agenda around climate refugees is forming, but this needs maybe a decade until [it] is really institutionalized in the political process, in the form of legal agreements, funding structures and implementation programs.”

In a December 2008 article in Environment magazine, Professor Biermann and researcher Ingrid Boas made the case for a global protocol to deal with climate refugees. In his conversation with ISN Security Watch, Professor Biermann underscored, “We propose a fund that is specifically there for climate refugees.”

Resettlement easier said than done

Eventually, to avoid the most adverse of scenarios, resettlement and funding schemes will be needed. Civil society is leading the charge. Due to their proximity to the Pacific islands, the governments of Australia and New Zealand have become early targets of pressure.

The right to resettlement, however, begs a fundamental question: How does the international community distinguish between victims of climate change and casualties of unsustainable development? Professor Biermann explains that although this distinction may be useful in the developed world, elsewhere it is unfitting. “It is difficult to say for developing countries [...] you can’t tell the Egyptians its your problem that you settled in the Nile [Delta], because this what they have been doing for the last 5,000 years.

“[That] is why we make the distinction between climate refugees and other refugees – because of the moral link between causation and consequence. Rich industrialized countries, they have been responsible for the largest part of this problem.”

Any resettlement, nevertheless, will likely be onerous. Displaced populations may be forced to take up residence in foreign countries, straining cultural traditions and in certain cases the very existence of their national identities. Refugees, never mind their genesis, are rarely regarded as a blessing. They necessitate costly assistance and their presence – albeit through no fault of their own – frequently engenders political strife with local communities, all the more reason for drafting resettlement schemes early on.

Sea change for developing countries

Those living near low-lying coastal areas are most exposed. The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) expects sea levels to rise anywhere from 9 to 88 cm by 2100. (Note: Some regard this estimate as too conservative). Of a projected global population of 9 billion in 2050, just under one-third will live within 96 kilometers of the coasts.

Some idyllic small island states – many members to the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) – are at risk of disappearing entirely. The atolls of Tuvalu lie just 4.5 meters above sea level. A sea level rise of one meter threatens flooding, crop destruction and fresh water contamination. President Anote Tong of Kiribati told the UN he expected his country to become uninhabitable in 50 years, arguing: “Our very lives are at stake.” Maldives President Mohamed Nasheed has publicly expressed his interest in relocating the country.

Large river deltas are another imperiled area. In Bangladesh, one of the lowest-lying countries in the world, locals are contemplating ways to move their livelihoods onto boats. Bangladesh stands to generate 20 million climate refugees by 2030. Sections of the eastern coast of China, the Niger Delta region, The Netherlands and Venice, among others, face increasing prospects of flooding.

The US Gulf Coast, in addition to being a victim of coastal erosion and rising sea levels, has as of late demonstrated the dangers associated with the increased incidence of severe weather events.

Fresh water shortages, encroaching desertification and declining food production in equatorial regions represent other sources for concern. This has already manifested itself in East Africa. The conflict in Darfur, which has left an estimated 300,000 dead and 2.7 million displaced, arose in part because of encroaching desertification, scarce grazing opportunities for livestock and resource competition. Climate change has forced an estimated one million pastoralists in Kenya to renounce their livelihoods. Over the past 100 years, Kenya has fallen prey to 28 major droughts. Their frequency is increasing.

Central and Eastern Asia will likely experience significant fresh water shortages. India, Pakistan, China and the Central Asian countries all rely on river systems fed by glacial waters that originate in the Himalayas. Receding glaciers equal diminishing water supplies.

Setting priorities a priority

Climate refugees exemplify the human security challenges associated with climate change. Even though, as Professor Biermann points out, the discussion on climate refugees remains in its infancy, priorities lie ahead for the international community and developed countries in particular.

If 1.5 to 2 percent of the global population has the potential to find itself on the move by 2050, the international community must make headway in defining legally who does and does not constitutes a climate refugee. It is also incumbent on the international community to draft and approve comprehensive resettlement and funding schemes. If the unavoidable, yet predictable security perils of climate change are to be mitigated, orderly resettlement will be of paramount import.

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UBS: Banking on Secrecy

Published August 11, 2009 Banking Secrecy Leave a Comment

UBS’ gall blights Swiss banking secrecy and ignites the debate over offshore tax havens, while Bern mounts a defense to save what it can, Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch, 18 Mar 2009

They could have stayed home, waited for the money and profited handsomely. Instead, in the mad dash to make cash, UBS experimented. With its misdeeds now exposed, a Swiss national value stands blighted. And Bern is forced to defend itself in an unpleasant row.

Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) is the world’s largest wealth management firm. At its apogee in mid-2007, UBS managed assets north of US$2 trillion. The global economic crisis has forced UBS to write down more than any other European bank, US$50 billion plus. The bank has groveled for loans from both the National Bank of Switzerland and the Singapore government. The latest scandal precipitated a massive boardroom reshuffle.

The financial sector is a cornerstone of the Swiss economy. According to the website of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the financial sector contributes to over 10 percent of Swiss gross domestic product (GDP) and employs roughly 6 percent of the country’s workforce. Estimates suggest Switzerland is the single largest offshore center, caching just under one-third the total offshore assets of the world’s high net-worth individuals (HNWIs). (Typically, any person or family with investable assets in excess of US$1 million constitutes an HNWI.)

The Road to the Courthouse

Instead of operating in the US exclusively by way of its registered wealth management arm, UBS dispatched unlicensed client advisors from Switzerland, possibly on as many as 3800 meetings. They assisted US citizens with funneling money into offshore accounts and hiding incomes from the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Internal e-mails leaked to the press confirm UBS understood its behavior to be criminal.

Client advisors employed nefarious tactics. They dubbed clients with code names, made calls using pay phones, traveled with encrypted computers, received training in counter-surveillance techniques, and claimed on US immigration forms that their trips were for personal leisure rather than business. The US Justice Department estimates UBS helped American HNWIs stash in the neighborhood of US$14.8 billion.

The affair first came to light when in June 2008, Bradley Birkenfeld, a US citizen and former UBS employee, himself indicted for tax fraud, cut a deal with US tax authorities. His cooperation alleged that over the period 2002 to 2007 UBS helped American HNWIs commit massive tax fraud.

On 1 July 2008, US authorities initiated a “John Doe summons” against UBS in a Miami criminal court. Their aim: to learn the names of what they suspected to be some 19,000 US citizens banking with UBS. Eight months later, on 18 February 2009, UBS admitted guilt and entered into a deferred prosecution agreement. In exchange, the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (Finma), with the approval of Swiss Federal Councilor Hans-Rudolf Merz – who oversees the financial dossier – ordered UBS to release the names of some 250 to 300 US clients suspected of meeting the threshold for tax fraud in Switzerland. UBS also paid a US$780 million fine and pledged to exit the US wealth management business.

The deferred prosecution agreement, however, stipulated ancillary conditions. The US would still pursue a civil suit to disclose the names of what is now believed to be some 52,000 US clients. Were UBS to lose the suit or fail to comply, the US reserved the right to reopen criminal proceedings.

The stipulation has grown into a major bone of contention. The Swiss government views it as a fishing expedition, illegal under Swiss law and an existential threat to banking secrecy and has ordered UBS not to comply. The US claims it is simply trying to audit taxpayers, and if necessary, recover back taxes. In the words of Senator Carl Levin (D), who is spearheading the initiative in the US Congress, “This kind of conduct, which actively facilitates tax evasion, amounts to a declaration of war by offshore secrecy jurisdictions against honest hard-working tax payers.

“We’re determined to fight back and end the abuses inflicted on us by those tax havens.”

The Swiss up in Arms

Back in Switzerland, the public chastised Merz for permitting selected information exchanges. He defended himself in front of his party, the FDP/Liberal center-right coalition, arguing that banking secrecy does not shield against blatant cases of tax fraud. Not all were convinced. Many asked themselves, moreover, why diplomats had made no progress during the initial phase of the investigation from July 2008 to February 2009.

On 6 March, Merz convened a group of experts to determine what aspects of banking secrecy could be reformed and enumerated Switzerland’s options: give up banking secrecy altogether, remain steadfast or seek compromise. The Federal Council opted for the latter.

Merz advocated early on the need to make concessions to safeguard banking secrecy. The left-of-center Socialist Democratic Party (SP) welcomed efforts in this direction. The center Christian Democratic People’s Party (CVP) voiced its understanding. The right-wing Swiss People’s Party (SVP), the largest in Parliament, called instead for retaliation.

As Levin put it, the Swiss covet banking secrecy. “The Swiss hold out bank secrecy as a national value. In the way Americans prize freedom and democracy, the Swiss claim that bank secrecy is essential to protecting individual privacy.” Switzerland legally anchored banking secrecy in Article 47 of the Banking Law of 1934. Paradoxically, outside pressure played a role in its codification.

Swiss banking secrecy, which has existed either implicitly or at the cantonal level for roughly 300 years, was written into federal law because of experiences with the economic turmoil of the Great Depression. Suspicions of snooping Nazis and the ‘Paris Affair’ – a scandal in which French authorities tried to recover taxes from their own country’s elite – confirmed the need for federally guaranteed banking secrecy. Most Swiss still deem banking secrecy to be an integral element of an individual’s right to privacy. In a 1984 referendum, 73 percent of Swiss voted to uphold it. An 11 March 2009 opinion poll by the Swiss Bankers Association concluded that 78 percent of Swiss citizens support the preservation of bank-client confidentiality.

In practice, of course, the Swiss financial community profits considerably from banking secrecy. Yet as Vogler argues, it alone cannot explain Switzerland’s financial allure. A high degree of political stability, Switzerland’s sound monetary policy, and the stability and easy convertibility of the Swiss Franc also play their part.

The Swiss argue quietly, moreover, that they are just one among many, competing in an international business worth trillions and governed by tax arbitrage. Numerous other countries also offer incentives to attract HNWIs and other large concentrations of wealth. Morality, the argument goes, is a poor metric.

The trust, a model that emerged from the Anglo-Saxon tradition, offers a similar arrangement to banking secrecy. An irrevocable trust can achieve significant tax breaks, similar if not akin to those afforded by banking secrecy. Moreover, incurious islands, some under the jurisdictions of the US and the UK, provide offshore banking services close to home. Among their ranks are the US Virgin Islands, Anguilla, Bermuda, the Cayman Islands and the Isle of Man.

The US state of Delaware is also a frequent target of criticism, with 63 percent of all Fortune 500 companies and more than 50 percent of all publicly traded companies in the US incorporated there. The US Government Accountability Office estimated in January 2009 that many publicly traded US companies, some even Washington bailout recipients, have offshore holdings. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel prize-winning US economist, who heads a UN-sponsored panel charged with making recommendations for reforming the international financial architecture, has expressed his concern over not only offshore banking, but also opaque onshore centers.

Bern Scrambles to React…

Tax treaties exist between the US and Switzerland that set the parameters for information exchanges and double taxation limits. The dilemma with information exchanges, however, is one of the chicken and the egg. Switzerland distinguishes between tax fraud and tax evasion: Tax fraud is a criminal offense, while tax evasion is a civil infraction. The former involves downright lying on tax forms. The latter entails omitting some of the truth.

Under the existing treaty regime, in order to release names and remain in compliance with Swiss law, the authorities at Finma must have convincing evidence of tax fraud. In the case of tax evasion, no information is shared. Any US effort to obtain financial details hinges on providing Finma with a name and evidence of tax fraud, effectively tying the US’ hands but for a few exceptions.

US and EU pressure over the past month, nevertheless, has convinced Switzerland that reforming banking secrecy and embracing diplomatic negotiations are the only viable ways forward.

Switzerland has sought out good company. Officials from Austria and Luxembourg – countries that also have banking secrecy policies – stated on 9 March they backed Switzerland in its row with the US. Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, a dual Czech and Swiss citizen, argued to the Neue Züricher Zeitung (NZZ) that people should not try to “break” Swiss tradition. His country presently holds the rotating EU presidency.

Switzerland has also started to prime diplomatic channels. Federal Councilor and Justice Minister Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf traveled to Washington DC to meet her US counterpart, Attorney General Eric Holder on 2 March. Upon arrival, a Holder surrogate received her. The attorney general previously represented UBS in legal proceedings, creating a conflict of interest and forcing him to forgo talks. Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey met briefly with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on 6 March in Geneva.

In addition to making the diplomatic rounds, Switzerland may emphasize its material leverage. The Good Offices of Switzerland protect US interests in Tehran and Havana, as well as of late Russia’s interests in Georgia and vice versa. Switzerland is also considering accepting inmates from the Guantanamo Bay detention center for the US.

UBS’ capital management and investment banking businesses employ roughly 25,000 people in the US. A source, who prefers to remain anonymous, but is intimately familiar with the bank’s US portfolio told the ISN Security Watch, “These businesses are sound, not yet profitable, but solvent. And unlike UBS’ wealth management arm, no noteworthy fraud.”

Holder’s conflict of interest is a harbinger of what probably lies underneath. If Switzerland releases the names of some 47,000 American HNWIs individuals (this was the latest figure hinted at by UBS’ Chief Financial Officer Mark Branson at a 4 March congressional hearing in Washington DC) the names are likely to include prominent personalities in business and government, or in other words, America’s elite.

Bern’s most immediate challenge, however, is to avoid getting blacklisted at the G20 London Summit on 2 April. French President Nicholas Sarkozy and Germany’s Angela Merkel have both expressed their support for stigmatizing Switzerland and adding it to the OECD’s uncooperative tax haven blacklist. Rumors abound that a new draft of the OECD blacklist names Switzerland.

…and Relents

On Friday, 13 March, the Federal Council yielded and adopted a more permissive standard for information exchanges in line with OECD rules. The move came on the heels of Liechtenstein and Andorra announcing that they too would ease banking secrecy laws in response to international pressure.

The Swiss government no longer distinguishes between tax fraud and tax evasion for foreigners. It will have to renegotiate numerous treaties. As before, however, automatic information exchanges are forbidden. A foreign country suspecting its citizen of tax fraud must first furnish Swiss authorities with satisfactory particulars to justify releasing a name, a potentially subjective sticking point. For Swiss citizens, the distinction between tax fraud and tax evasion persists.

The coming weeks will reveal whether the Swiss Federal Council compromised sufficiently to dodge the OECD blacklist. They will also make known whether diplomacy can settle the Miami civil suit. Regardless, UBS’ gall – a patent transgression of US law – has challenged Switzerland’s sovereignty, ignited the debate over offshore tax havens and undermined the reputation of Switzerland’s banking services.

Original Print: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=97855

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Geoengineering: Cloudy science clears

Published August 11, 2009 Climate Change Leave a Comment

As the fight to curb climate change dithers, manipulating the climate through the ‘junk science’ of geoengineering may offer a boon, Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch, 23 Feb 2009

When does junk science turn sound? Perhaps when it concerns climate change and geoengineering. It’s a risky proposition, yet the likelihood of missing the window to curb climate change is growing, and a geoengineering contingency plan may prove useful.

Geoengineering entails the large-scale manipulation of climate processes to curb or limit the effects of global climate change. Proposals focus on increasing the earth’s albedo, limiting the amount of sunlight that strikes the earth, and reducing the concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere – the chief greenhouse gas (GHG).

Industrialization, first attempted by the British in the 19th century and then proliferated throughout the world, can be thought of as a giant geoengineering experiment of sorts, just unintentional and in reverse. Humans have worked diligently to extract carbon from the ground and to burn it to produce energy. This excess carbon now needs to go back underground or into the oceans, lest global temperatures continue to increase.

The facts

The projections for climate change offer a sobering reality. The concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere during the pre-industrial age measured 280 ppm. That has increased dramatically to form the inverted and now familiar hockey stick graph. In 2008, according to measurements taken at the Mauna Loa Observatory in Hawaii, the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere attained 386 ppm. It continues to increase at the rate of slightly more than 2 ppm per year.

The 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report asserted that in order to stabilize the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere below 400 ppm, the world would have to reduce emissions by 85 percent to 50 percent by 2050. So doing, nevertheless, still commits the world to a 2 – 2.4 degree global increase in temperatures and a .4 to 1.4 meter rise in sea levels. By 2100, the report estimates, sea levels could swell anywhere from 9-88 cm depending on the scenario. These models, however, only consider sea level rises due to thermal expansion of the oceans, and do not take into account melting of the Greenland and Antarctica ice sheets. The estimates therefore could be low.

Some concur. Dr James E Hansen from the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies in New York is among the most vocal. In a 2007 article, Hansen asserted that the global climate system might be approaching a tipping point. Tipping points occur when climate change achieves a new state or plateau that triggers positive feedback loops. The summer melting of the polar ice cap, which serves to reflect much of the sun’s energy back into space, and the thawing of the Siberian tundra, which stores large quantities of methane gas, another warming agent, could accelerate climate change and lead to more rapid sea level rises than forecast.

The Republic of Maldives is taking such concerns to heart. Member of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Maldives has set aside funds in its budget to save up for a new home. Lying just a meter or two above sea level, most of the islands in the Maldives archipelago could disappear, forcing the population to resettle.

Dithering

This reality raises pressing security concerns. Roughly one-third of the world’s population, 2.75 billion people, will live within 96 kilometers of the coast by 2025. Rising sea levels could generate large numbers of climate refugees, endanger global stability and put pressure on inland settlements and water resources. (This map reveals the impact of rising sea levels and the capacity for dislocation.)

Politically, curbing global warming is nearly intractable. The profound lack of urgency is due in large part to the imperceptibility of long-term climate changes. Yet other factors also contribute. A collective action problem plagues the individual level of analysis. The low price of fossil fuels, at least for the moment and relative to alternatives, permits individuals to consume prodigally and hinders the emergence of political pressures for reform.

At the national level, established interests such as the utility and oil industries, as well as others, are notorious for lobbying vigorously to steer clear of costly regulations. And in the international arena, the clash between developed and developing countries and their respective responsibilities to reduce emissions stymie progress.

Moreover, the estimated costs of any emissions reduction scheme further suppress appetites for reform. The 2006 Stern Review, an often-cited study, estimated that 1 percent of GDP would have to be invested to avoid the worst effects of climate change. Two years later, Sir Nicholas Stern revised his estimates and announced 2 percent of GDP may be necessary to compensate for observed accelerations in climate change.

Yet more than almost any other issue, this global problem necessitates a global solution. The diplomatic record is inauspicious. From the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to Kyoto, on to Bali, and soon on to Copenhagen, reluctance has prevailed. The US delegation to Bali under the former Bush administration capitulated just minutes before the conference’s close and under significant pressure from other delegations, agreeing ultimately to continue talks to finalize a new multilateral treaty to replace Kyoto in Copenhagen in December 2009.

The new US administration appears more amenable. On the White House website, US President Barack Obama states that his environmental policy is to reduce GHG emissions by 80 percent by 2050. True to form, he mentions no details. Yet his disposition remains propitious.

The schemes

The prospective costs of geoengineering schemes, conversely, amount to a fraction of the costs of reducing emissions. David G Victor, a professor at Stanford University and an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, noted in a November 2008 article in the Oxford Review of Economic Policy that “early estimates suggest that the discounted present cost of a geoengineering program extended into perpetuity is of the order of $100 billion, which compares favorably with the $1 trillion order-of-magnitude costs for mitigation.”

Several geoengineering schemes have been suggested. One is to increase the earth’s reflectivity or albedo by spraying sulfur dioxide or synthetic aerosols into the stratosphere. Another idea, set forth by Professors Stephen Saltner and John Lantham, is to spray salt into the troposphere using a flotilla of Flettner vessels to cloud-seed, which would generate additional clouds and reflect more sunlight back into space.

As of yet, salt is not considered a pollutant. But sulfur dioxide, which causes acid rain, has already been the target of international regulation. The notion of “whitening” the surface of the earth, i.e. painting roofs white, has also been brainstormed. Its impact, however, remains dubitable.

To decrease the amount of sunlight striking the planet, some have considered deploying massive sunshields into space. The obstacles to overcome are multitudinous and the unintended consequences could be grave.

Finally, a number of proposals have focused on actually removing CO2 from the atmosphere, so-called “carbon sequestration.” Plans include fertilizing the oceans with iron to spur phytoplankton growth and planting more trees. Both would remove CO2 from the atmosphere automatically while undergoing life processes. The problem with fertilizing the oceans, however, is surging acidification, which dissolves the shells of marine animals and destroys coral reefs, a first line of defense against coastal erosion.

The experts

Experts remain divided on geoengineering’s final merits, but interests are piqued. Researchers at the University of East Anglia (UEA) in the UK concluded the first comprehensive assessment of the climate cooling potential of different geoengineering schemes in late January 2009. They reckon that “enhancing carbon sinks could bring CO2 back to its pre-industrial level, but not before 2100 – and only when combined with strong mitigation of CO2 emissions.”

Moreover, “stratospheric aerosol injections and sunshades in space have by far the greatest potential to cool the climate by 2050 – but also carry the greatest risk.”

Not to be outdone, scientists at the Royal Society in the UK launched their own study into the potential for various geoengineering schemes. The chair of the Royal Society working group undertaking the study, Professor John Shepherd, noted, “Some of these proposals seem fantastical, and may prove to be so. Our study aims to separate the science from the science fiction and offer recommendations on which options deserve serious consideration.”

Dr Ken Caldeira from the Department of Ecology at the Carnegie Institution for Science stated in a testimony before the British House of Commons: “We need a climate engineering research and development plan. The widespread desire for the “good life” afforded by economic growth and development places us increasingly at risk of profound and widespread climate damage […] prudence demands that we consider what we might do if cuts in carbon dioxide emissions prove too little or too late to avoid unacceptable climate damage.”

Elsewhere, a May 2008 workshop on geoengineering at the Council on Foreign Relations highlighted the potential benefits of unilateral geoengineering. If the international political process to curb climate change stays bogged down, a small group of wealthy, like-minded nations could conceivably undertake geoengineering projects on their own and mitigate exposure to the most pernicious effects of climate change. However, the workshop cautions that without coordination, some states may decide to undertake dangerous geoengineering projects that could do more harm than good.

Fund the science

With US President Obama set on curbing anthropogenic warming of the earth’s atmosphere, geoengineering deserves further consideration. Studies in the UK are under way. The US – historically the world’s foremost emitter – should follow suit. Providing added funding for the science is the first step to ascertaining the true potential, both good and bad, of any geoengineering scheme.

There looms, at last, the risk of moral hazard – relying exclusively on geoengineering as a means to tackle climate change as technological solutions begin to crystallize. Obama should use his normative influence to caution emphatically against taking the easy way out.

Geology Professor Steve Wojtal, Oberlin College, told the ISN Security Watch: “I am afraid that the global society will need to draw upon the full range of options to address the issue of climate change effectively. I believe, however, that there are a wide range of unintended consequences that can arise when we attempt to use what I call a ‘technological fix’ to address a problem that has arisen as a result of rampant technology.”

Geoengineering may help, but it’s no Plan A.

Original Print: http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?ots591=4888CAA0-B3DB-1461-98B9-E20E7B9C13D4&lng=en&id=96814

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Bringing down al-Bashir

Published August 11, 2009 International Criminal Justice Leave a Comment

An ICC indictment against Sudanese President al-Bashir appears to be forthcoming, but arresting the terror of Darfur could prove complicated, Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch, 26 Jan 2009

An official indictment against Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir is expected sooner rather than later, possibly before the end of February, which would make the embattled leader the first head of state indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

ICC Chief Prosecutor Louis Moreno-Ocampo applied for an arrest warrant on 14 July 2008 for charges that include 10 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. The issuance of an arrest warrant will mark a milestone for the ICC, the people of Darfur and international criminal law in general.

The Darfur conflict started in February 2003. In an attempt to take advantage of the political opening generated by negotiations on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) – which tenuously ended the 20-year North-South civil war in Sudan – the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) launched attacks on Sudanese government installations. Their grievances focused on Khartoum’s economic and political marginalization of Darfur; issues aggravated by encroaching desertification and increased resource competition.

Khartoum’s response was devastating. It funded the janjaweed militias to carry out, in collaboration with the armed forces of the government of Sudan, a heinous campaign of violence against the people of Darfur. The conflict probably remains – save for the Second Congo War – the international community’s most neglected of the past decade.

President al-Bashir came to power in 1989 when, as a colonel in the Sudanese army, he orchestrated a bloodless coup that ousted democratically elected prime minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. The Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation was installed and al-Bashir was declared its chairman. In 1993, al-Bashir dissolved the council and appointed himself president.

On 31 March 2005, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1593 that referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC. Two of the UNSC’s permanent members, the US and China, abstained from voting. The US, actively opposed to the ICC under the Bush administration but committed to pursuing justice in Darfur, did not block the resolution’s passage. China, which maintains significant economic investments in Sudan’s petroleum sector, expressed its preference for a national prosecution, but normative pressures likely persuaded it to abstain as well. With Resolution 1593 adopted, Ocampo opened his investigation.

The prospects for an indictment appear to have unsettled al-Bashir. In October 2008, the GoS embraced a Qatari initiative sponsored by the Arab League and the African Union to negotiate a peace settlement. Shortly thereafter, on 12 November 2008, al-Bashir ordered an immediate ceasefire to the Darfur conflict. He has called for similar ceasefires before, and they all proved fleeting. These expediently timed examples, nevertheless, suggest some limited vulnerability to normative pressures.

Ocampo’s warrant request will likely be approved, but the charge of genocide may be dismissed. In his application, the chief prosecutor noted that al-Bashir “masterminded and implemented a plan to destroy in substantial part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups, on account of their ethnicity.” In the event Ocampo fails to meet the evidentiary threshold for genocide, he could still move forward with the war crimes and crimes against humanity charges. His reputation, however, would take a hit.

It would come in addition to his office’s mismanagement of potentially exculpatory evidence in the case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, former leader of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC). This misstep delayed Lubanga’s trail and raised suspicions concerning Ocampo’s prosecutorial integrity.

When an indictment is handed down, al-Bashir’s reaction will be closely watched. The possibility remains that he may retaliate by authorizing another campaign of violence.

The eventuality illustrates the peace versus justice debate, and raises the prospects for an Article 16 suspension. Article 16 of the Rome Statute permits, by vote of the UNSC, the suspension of an ICC investigation for one year and is renewable. Both France and the UK have hinted at supporting an Article 16 suspension, but their final intentions remain uncertain. China probably wishes it had vetoed Resolution 1593 when it had the chance. Now it finds itselflobbying UNSC members to support a suspension. A US veto could in any case block such an initiative. It remains to be seen how the Obama administration will act.

The janjaweed and the armed forces of the government of Sudan have ravaged Darfur. Of a population of 6-7 million, the UN claims that possibly 300,000 plus Darfurians have been killed, up to 2.6 million displaced, and 4.7 million affected by the conflict. Given al-Bashir’s ruthlessness and insincerity, as well as the broad measure of neglect the international community has already demonstrated on Darfur, delaying the pursuit of justice will only exacerbate the plight of Darfur, not improve it.

Once an arrest warrant is issued, one critical matter then remains outstanding: How to go about apprehending al-Bashir? As of yet, no plan exists.

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Sudan: China is the key

Published August 11, 2009 International Criminal Justice Leave a Comment

In the strategic hinterland of East Africa lays the world’s most neglected conflict, but the incoming Obama administration can show its resolve to combat genocide, Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch, 10 Nov 2008

It is near the bottom of the Obama to-do list: But with Darfur, the incoming US administration has the opportunity to do more than its predecessor. The solution is China, but the approach necessitates subtlety.

China and its national oil company, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), have been doing business in Sudan since the early 1990s. Since then, Beijing and the CNPC have bankrolled Khartoum, consciously ignored genocide and helped perpetuate conflict.

It would seem therefore that to change Khartoum’s behavior, scheduling a meeting with Beijing would be a good first step. Wrong. Today the US is more than ever in need of amicable relations with China. The evolving financial crisis demands fervent Sino-US cooperation. To avoid costly schisms that could imperil constructive collaboration, the US should for the time being shelve efforts to bilaterally pressure China on Darfur.

History moreover underscores this conclusion. Pressuring China on human rights directly has often failed to bear fruit. President Bill Clinton tried it in his first term, only to shift his focus to improving trade relations in his second term to encourage political liberalization and enhance Beijing’s respect for human rights.

Therefore, the way forward on Darfur entails indirect, not direct US coercion of Beijing. To accomplish this, the new White House should engage civil society, throw its weight behind the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) proceedings in Sudan early on, and call for the full deployment of the hybrid African Union-United Nations peacekeeping force.

Since 1993, China has been a net importer of oil. This has forced the Communist Party of China (CPC) to look beyond its own borders to find reliable suppliers to maintain its domestic pledge of economic growth – the CPC’s chief pillar of legitimacy. Africa has become a favorite destination. China’s inroads into Africa have included among others Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Algeria, Chad, Equatorial Guinea and Sudan. China’s pursuits in Sudan represent its largest and most successful international oil expedition to date.

US-based Chevron Corporation first discovered oil in Southern Sudan in 1978. Its presence however was short lived. Upon the outbreak of war in Southern Sudan in the early 1980s, Chevron’s operations withered. The company never extracted any oil from Sudan and eventually sold its concessions.

During the 1990s, the Canadian firm Arakis Energy Corporation, later acquired by Talisman Energy Inc, operated in Sudan. But it also left before significantly developing its operations; however, not on account of security concerns but normative pressures from back home.

The CNPC has had a presence in Sudan since 1992. When Talisman Energy left in 2003, it became the largest proprietor of the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), holding a 40 percent ownership stake. The GNPOC was incorporated in 1997 and is today a joint venture owned in collaboration with CNPC by India’s ONGC (25 percent), Malaysia’s Petronas (30 percent), and Sudan’s Sudapet (5 percent). It is principally responsible for oil exploration and production in Sudan.

China not only operates in Sudan, but also imports billions of dollars worth of oil from Sudan. In 1999, the CNPC extracted approximately 25,000 barrels per day (bpd). By 2002, this number reached 100,000 bpd. By 2006, CNPC was extracting 220,000 bpd and sending over 60 percent back home. In 2005, Sudan made up 5 percent of China’s oil imports. Over the past decade, depending on the price of oil, Sudan sold anywhere from US$3 to US$6 billion worth of oil to China per year.

Khartoum used this revenue to fund the Darfur conflict, which has generated an estimated 300,000 victims and displaced another 2 million. The UN claims 230,000 people fled the conflict in 2008 alone.

For both China and Sudan there are benefits and drawbacks to their relationship. Beijing provides Khartoum with foreign exchange, arms to conduct its internal wars and diplomatic cover at the UN. Conversely, Khartoum supplies Beijing with much needed oil and a public relations headache.

China’s pre-eminence and leverage in Sudan as well as its status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council renders it the most responsible international actor in the non-resolution of the Darfur conflict. All the same, due to current global economic conditions the US should not exert direct pressure on China to reform. The incoming US administration should instead make use of alternative avenues.

For the incoming Obama administration, engaging civil society is a good idea because China cares about image politics. Proof of this lies in the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics. Civil society, particularly the media, has the platform and voice to stigmatize China on Darfur.

Supporting the ICC’s proceedings in Sudan is also sound policy for the new administration because the possibility of an indictment has markedly concerned Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. China on the other hand can save face by arguing the ICC is an autonomous international institution over which it no longer has control since abstaining on UN Security Council Resolution 1593 referring the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the ICC.

Moreover, the US should publicly pledge to veto any resolutions seeking to invoke Article 16 of the Rome Statute, which suspends an investigation for 12 months and is renewable. This could additionally help China elude a snag with Khartoum.

Finally, because of the value China ascribes to image politics, it has supported the hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force. Greater urgency on the part of an Obama administration to call for the full deployment of this force is unlikely to alienate China but help Darfuris.

Pressing economic concerns now regrettably overshadow and thwart US efforts to tackle Darfur by way of direct diplomacy or military action. But by engaging civil society, backing the ICC’s investigation in Sudan, and calling for the full deployment of the hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force, the incoming US administration can begin to make progress on Darfur and elucidate a firm stance against genocide.

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On shaky ground

Published August 11, 2009 Other Leave a Comment

Dramatic volatility in world financial markets promises to affect not only the industrialized world, but also leading exporter China. The CPC’s future in focus. Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch, 8 Oct 2008

The Schadenfreude came first. Then governments watched financial chaos permeate world markets, and anxiety quickly took its place. It has become abundantly clear that everyone will be affected.

The month of September 2008 ushered in the most severe financial crisis since 29 October 1929. Many analysts foresaw an economic downturn stemming from a ballooning US housing market. But that it would crumble, and consequently spread precipitously took most by surprise.

Economists and central bankers are now focusing on jump-starting frozen credit and inter-bank lending markets. It is proving to be no simple task. Political scientists, alternatively, must begin considering the political instabilities that have historically succeeded such economic crises.

Today’s most volatile case is the People’s Republic of China. Can the Communist Party of China (CPC) weather the impending storm?

Since committing to economic liberalization under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China has maintained its autocratic political structure. Mao Zedong first introduced it in 1949.

The contradictory nature of an open economic sphere – the state now controls less than one-third of China’s economy – and a closed political arena, has forced the CPC to rely on two pillars of legitimacy: economic growth and nationalism.

Extraordinary economic growth has allowed the CPC to divert attention and quell calls for democratization. Since the events of Tiananmen Square in 1989, the CPC has experienced little domestic turmoil – with the exception of longstanding tensions with Tibet and Xinjiang Province in the northwest of China.

Nationalism is the CPC’s second pillar of legitimacy. It springs from China’s 5,000-year-old status as a great civilization and the foreign interference it suffered at the hands of the West from 1842 to 1945. The 1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War and Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931, moreover, reinforce the narrative of a humiliated China longing for atonement.

International trade and financial investment enabled China’s rapid growth over the past two decades. The industrialized world had moved into the post-Fordist era by the late-1980s, i.e. manufacturing no longer took place in the US, Europe and Japan, but rather in the world’s developing countries where labor was inexpensive. The industrialized world, instead, shifted to service-based economies. This, in effect, permitted China to become the world’s foremost manufacturer, and pursue an export-based growth strategy. Over the past 15 years, Chinese exports increased by 1,600 percent. Since 2005, exports have contributed to more than 20 percent of China’s growth.

Sino-US trade in 2007 amounted to US$385 billion. Sino-European trade came to roughly US$245 billion in 2005, and Sino-Japanese trade reached US$215 billion in 2007. The size of China’s trade with the world underlines its economic interdependence. So far, the balance was in China’s favor, and allowed it to amass an extraordinary US$1.8 trillion in foreign currency reserves.

The extent of China’s trade with the world therefore raises an important question. If international demand for Chinese products falls or even collapses, what next?

Weisbrot and Rosnick from the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington DC predicted back in July 2006 that the US import market would shrink over the decade 2010-2020. The current crisis promises to accelerate this trend. A consumer-based recession looms large in the US. Credit card issuers have lowered charge limits, many Americans live from pay check to pay check, are heavily indebted and have low savings rates.

If only US consumer demand drops, China’s growth will suffer. If European and Japanese consumer demand also declines, exporting in significant quantity will become difficult. Asia and the Middle East still import from China, but if the industrialized world slows, it is difficult to imagine that they will not follow suit.

The trend, unfortunately, is already observable. Chinese exports are falling, the Shanghai Stock Exchange is down 60 percent on the year-to-date, the Hang Seng index is down 45 percent, and property values in China, much like in the US, are plummeting. However, unlike US homeowners, the Chinese have not used home equity to finance their spending.

Investment, which comprises 40 percent of Chinese GDP, may sustain the economy for some time, but it too is likely to fall as international sources dry up. Chinese consumer spending, which makes up 30 percent of GDP, is a buffer, but insufficient. The government, finally, can employ its massive foreign currency reserves to subsidize the economy. However, time limits this strategy, and any large sell-offs will cause the dollar’s exchange rate to sink, consequently lowering the absolute value of Beijing’s reserves.

Not too long ago, the CPC may have welcomed a slowing Chinese economy to combat rising inflation. Now, a grinding halt may threaten the Party’s survival.

The coming years will prove decisive. Slow growth jeopardizes the CPC’s legitimacy and forces it to fall back on nationalist credentials – an exceedingly disconcerting notion. The still unpredictable depth of the global financial crisis is very likely to shake the CPC and test its fortitude. And in the worst-case scenario, it may even spell its demise.

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NMD: A logical contrariety

Published August 11, 2009 Arms Control Leave a Comment

Aside from that fact that the US NMD doesn’t work, it antagonizes Russia and works against crucial arms agreements, but the damage done is not irreversible, Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch, 26 Sep 2008

US National Missile Defense (NMD) is misleading. It unnecessarily antagonizes Russia, optimizes US imperialism, strains the US government’s budget – and doesn’t work.

It is high time for the US to consider putting to use the pledge of dismantling its NMD system to reorient the US-Russia arms control agenda. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty stands at the center of this debate.

National Missile Defense employs complex technologies to intercept incoming ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads. A powerful radar system that detects incoming missiles and a battery of countervailing missiles used to eliminate the threat comprise it – in theory, quite intriguing.

The idea of the NMD, first embodied by the Nike-Zeus program, has been floating around Washington since the late 1950s. However, until President Ronald Reagan’s term, it received little priority. That changed on 23 March 1983 when Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative for the NMD. The media quickly dubbed the concept “Star Wars.”

Reagan’s policy initiative survives to this day. Its offspring is the NMD system President George W Bush built in Alaska/California and Poland/Czech Republic, and its deployment is inimical.

Arms control is the centerpiece of US-Russia relations. The two states stockpile over 9,000 active nuclear warheads that amount to roughly 90 percent of the world’s nuclear arsenal.

In 1972, the US and the USSR negotiated the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) to limit the incidence of expensive and menacing arms races, the logic behind it being the following: If side A can block side B’s missiles, then side B would have to build more missiles to overcome side A’s NMD system. The inverse is also true. To mitigate potentially boundless spending and militarization, the ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of NMD systems for either side’s entire territory, and limits the testing of NMD systems in “ABM Mode” – the latter stipulation leaving room for interpretation.

The ABM Treaty plays a prominent role in the US-Russia arms control regime, which also includes the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the 1992 Treaty on Armed Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and several Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (STARTs), among others.

President Bill Clinton roughly adhered to the provisions of the ABM Treaty. Albeit permitting research on NMD systems and advocating modification of the ABM Treaty itself, he maintained that the deployment of an NMD system was inopportune.

Clinton’s heedful tone, however, briskly changed with the 2000 election of George W Bush. The Bush administration’s negotiation agenda in July 2001 was radical and obdurate.

His administration argued that in order to be able to protect US citizens from “rogue” state threats like Iran and North Korea, the NMD was necessary. Any ABM Treaty renegotiations that limited NMD deployment would be rejected.

Five months later, Bush acted by removing the legal impediments to NMD. On 13 December 2001, he announced the US’ unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, effective six months later.

Putin did not respond warmly to Bush’s decision. Russia declined to cooperate with START II treaty requirements following the US’ unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The START III treaty failed to gain any traction at all.

Upon concluding that the US NMD installations planned for construction in Poland and the Czech Republic were in fact going to be installed, Putin additionally declared on 14 July 2007 Russia’s intentions to suspend its cooperation with the CFE Treaty. He also threatened to withdraw from the INF Treaty. In other words, following the US’ withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the US-Russia arms control regime began to fray.

For all of the trouble Bush’s withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty and deployment of a NMD system created, did any benefits ensue? Not really.

Russia has yet to buy the US argument for protection from “rogue” state threats like Iran and North Korea.

Also, the NMD simply does not work. Tests have yet to demonstrate the US NMD system’s ability to ward off a nuclear strike. A small number of decoys, housed inside a ballistic missile carrying a nuclear warhead could easily overwhelm the system. The latest test conducted by the US military installed a guidance chip in the target missile to direct the destroying missile. This, at the very least, stretches the definition of “success.”

So what is the point behind US NMD? Bertel Heurlin argues that the US NMD is a flagrant example of US strategic expansionism. The long-term implications of this philosophy are what concerns Russia.

Besides the fact that the US NMD does not work and antagonizes Russia, it is expensive. The US spent an average of US$8.68 billion per year during 2006–2008 on the NMD, and it tops the list of US military expenditures for research programs.

Therefore, in a nutshell, the Bush administration spent tens-of-billions of dollars to deploy a system that doesn’t work, against a threat that has yet to materialize, and the consequences of which resulted in the dissolution of key treaties in one of the most sensitive areas of US foreign policy.

The damage done is not irreversible. A deployed NMD system supplies the US with leverage. Pledging to consider its deconstruction – which could save money – could be used to draw Russia back to the negotiating table to start rebuilding the US-Russia arms control architecture.

Options exist. START II would limit each side to 3,000 to 3,500 active nuclear warheads. START III could bring this number down even further to 2,000 or 2,500 nuclear warheads. Russia’s re-entry into the CFE Treaty and continued observance of the INF Treaty should also be addressed. The ABM Treaty requires recommitment.

Once Bush leaves office, changing course is a necessity. On 18 September 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev used a rather conciliatory tone toward the US at a ceremony for the new US ambassador to the Kremlin. His temperament stood in stark contrast to Russia’s affirmative demeanor immediately following the South Ossetia war in August.

Although today’s Russian leadership deserves little praise, nuclear arms control trumps these concerns.

The US NMD is not a good idea. Especially when it has still to prove its tactical utility.

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Dear Ambassador Bolton …

Published August 11, 2009 Arms Control Leave a Comment

Rather than making a case for an Israeli strike against Iran the US could find a more amenable partner in Iran by toning down the virulent rhetoric, Claudio Guler writes for ISN Security Watch.

By Claudio Guler for ISN Security Watch, 15 Sep 2008

Your recent opinion article in the Wall Street Journal, Israel, Iran and the Bomb, makes the case for a preventive Israeli air strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. In the article, you state that doing so will buy the West some much needed time.

I agree with you that a nuclear Iran is a decidedly unpleasant subject and would constitute a direct violation of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. All the same, your approach is dangerously myopic. This response argues in favor of an alternative approach, one that more carefully considers Iran’s perspective.

I do believe the Islamic Republic aims to develop a nuclear weapon: Why otherwise the obstinacy surrounding IAEA inspection requests? Yet Iran’s grounds for desiring a nuclear weapon are not altogether irrational.

Iran has an extensive history of foreign interference. The Qajar dynasty (1781 – 1925); the Russians (1911); the British and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (1925 – 1953); the 1953 CIA-led Operation Ajax, which ousted the democratically elected prime minister Mohammed Mosaddeq; and finally, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, a figure widely regarded an agent of US interests (1953 – 1979). This legacy, vivid in many Iranians’ memories, serves as political ammunition for the theocracy in Tehran.

More immediately, however, Iran finds itself encircled by the US military in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf, surrounded by the disproportionate might of the US.

The buyback contract Iran uses in its petroleum sector exemplifies this fear of foreign interference. The contract is a financing agreement that obliges any international oil company (IOC) to pay, upfront, the costs of exploring and drilling in Iran’s oil and natural gas fields. The National Iranian Oil Company then extracts the product and rewards the IOC a predetermined return on any profits realized. This arrangement prevents any IOC from establishing deep-seated influence in Tehran by way of foreign direct investment.

The plurality that exists within Iranian politics also requires mention, which you fail to appreciate. The best, and unfortunately squandered, example of this was the Iranian-led negotiation effort of 2003. At the time, reformist president Seyyed Mohammad Khatami made an overture to the US by way of the Swiss Embassy in Tehran.

Regrettably, the Bush administration offhandedly dismissed Khatami’s offer at a time when Iran’s leverage, with respect to today, was limited. It is curious to note that back then you were in the influential position of undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security.

In 2005, the radical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected president and Iran’s foreign policy became increasingly antagonistic. Hawkish ideologues seem to compliment one another.

Throughout your piece, you emphasize the immediacy of the Iranian nuclear threat. Here again, your analysis overlooks a critical factor. Israel, the purported target of an Iranian bomb, has its own nuclear deterrent.

You also openly call for regime change in Iran. The US tried this in 1953 and it backfired 26 years later, giving rise to the theocracy now ruling Iran. (Saddam’s 1980 invasion, admittedly, solidified the regime’s power.) With the US military standing at Iran’s doorstep, it is no wonder Tehran is hesitant to compromise on its nuclear program. No rational actor, under such hostile conditions would sacrifice its prime source of leverage.

Finally, you touch on the EU-3’s efforts. They have been ineffective. However, it is again hard to see how they could be effective if the US position is so openly hostile. By spearheading the dispute, Washington’s word is decisive. Why cut a deal with Brussels if Washington is going to dupe you anyway?

A preventive strike by Israel would gravely damage US-Iranian relations. Forget any plans for Iranian assistance in Iraq. Expect, rather, a deteriorating Iraqi security situation.

Sino-US relations would also suffer. China imports billions of dollars worth of oil from Iran every year and has other multi-billion dollar contracts with the National Iranian Oil Company. The largest, which materialized in 2004, is worth US$75-$100 billion and has a shelf life of 25 years. A strike would likely cause international oil prices to skyrocket and China would be exceedingly displeased. Additionally, the US economy could hardly cope. This unfortunately seems not to concern you: “We will be blamed for the strike anyway, and certainly feel whatever negative consequences result, so there is compelling logic to make it as successful as possible.”

To curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions, direct US-Iranian dialogue is necessary. The nuclear question must be on the table and confidence-building steps, endorsed multilaterally, should be taken early on. For example, the US could pledge to refrain from using force until a renewed diplomatic effort is exhausted.

Ultimately, however, the US must be willing to compromise. The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, other US restrictions against Iranian banks, the US’ list of state sponsors of terrorism as well as assistance with Iran’s civil nuclear program, as already offered by the EU-3, are all options. Brazenly advocating for regime change is not a sound negotiating platform.

The Israeli limited-strike option is viable even after a new US president takes office on 20 January 2009. By toning down the virulent rhetoric, the US may find in Iran a more amenable partner than it expects.

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